When you acquire a company, you also acquire everything wrong with its security. Smaller buyers can least afford the surprise.

When Verizon agreed to buy Yahoo, two enormous data breaches surfaced during the process, eventually understood to affect all three billion Yahoo accounts. Verizon cut the purchase price by $350 million, the two sides agreed to share the legal fallout, and Yahoo later paid a $35 million SEC penalty for failing to disclose the breaches in the first place.
When Marriott bought Starwood in 2016, it inherited a reservation system that attackers had been living inside since 2014. No one noticed until 2018, by which point the intruders had been resident for roughly four years, two before the deal and two after. The breach exposed the records of hundreds of millions of guests, including millions of unencrypted passport numbers. The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office fined Marriott 18.4 million pounds, after initially proposing 99 million, and explicitly faulted the company for insufficient due diligence. A 2024 settlement with the FTC and state attorneys general followed.
Marriott and Verizon survived. They are enormous. The lesson for a smaller acquirer is the uncomfortable inverse: if a breach of that magnitude is a line item for a global company, a far smaller breach can be fatal to a deal a fraction of the size. You are buying the same kind of risk with far less margin to absorb it.
Smaller targets often have weaker security. A founder-run company, a regional competitor, or a bolt on acquisition frequently has no security leader, informal IT, unmanaged devices, and years of accumulated technical debt. The smaller the target, the more likely its security has never been seriously examined.
Smaller deals get thinner diligence. On a modest transaction, the budget and the calendar are tight, so cyber gets reduced to a questionnaire the seller fills out about itself. That is not diligence. It is self attestation, and a seller who does not know it has a problem cannot disclose it.
The math is less forgiving. The global average cost of a data breach reached 4.88 million dollars in 2024, according to IBM. A figure like that barely moves a multinational. Against a single digit or low double digit million dollar acquisition, it can wipe out the entire investment thesis.
The “too small to be a target” myth. Attackers do not hand pick victims by brand name. They scan for exposure and exploit what they find, and smaller companies tend to have more of it. Being unknown is not the same as being safe.
When the deal closes, you do not just acquire revenue and people. You acquire the target’s entire security posture and its history, including:
Across the deal community, cyber surprises are common, not rare. In a widely cited Forescout survey, 53%of acquirers said they had encountered a cybersecurity issue during M&A due diligence serious enough to jeopardize the deal, and 73% said an undisclosed data breach would be an immediate deal breaker. Other studies repeatedly find that a large share of buyers discover a security problem only after the transaction has closed, when the leverage to do anything about it is gone.
That timing is the whole point. Before you close, a finding is a negotiating chip. After you close, the same finding is a cost you simply own.
A scoped assessment like this can be completed in days to a few weeks, which is exactly what a real deal timeline allows.
Diligence only pays off if it changes what you do. A cyber finding is leverage, and you have several ways to use it:
Closing is not the finish line. It is the start of the most dangerous window.
Integration is when environments get connected, staff turn over, and attention drifts, which is precisely when an inherited problem becomes an active incident. Recall that Marriott’s intruders kept operating for two years after the acquisition closed. A focused first 100 day plan, fixing the fundamentals, closing the gaps diligence found, and putting someone in charge of security, prevents the slow motion version of the same mistake.
For private equity buyers, this scales into a portfolio wide concern. A buy and build or rollup strategy aggregates the risk of every company you add, and a single weak portfolio company can become the path into the platform. Handled well, the reverse is also true: improving a portfolio company’s security is a value creation lever that reduces risk, satisfies the next buyer’s diligence, and protects the exit multiple.
And if you are on the other side, a small or midsize company planning to be acquired, the same logic runs in your favor. Getting your security in order before you go to market is sell side readiness that protects your valuation, because the breach the buyer finds is the discount the buyer takes.
Every acquisition is a cybersecurity decision, whether or not anyone treats it as one. The headline cases involved giants who could survive the hit. A small or midsize firm usually cannot, which makes proportionate, focused cyber due diligence one of the highest return moves in the entire deal. The cost of looking is a small, scoped engagement inside the diligence window. The cost of not looking is discovering, after the wire clears, that you bought the breach along with the business.
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